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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Rule 3(a) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and specific constitutional and 
statutory authority for this Court to hear this appeal is granted 
by Article VIII, Section 2 Constitution of the State of Utah and 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(e)(i). At issue is requested review 
of certain Orders of the Public Service Commission of the State of 
Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL 
1. Whether "standby fees11 or other similar charges are 
unreasonable, unlawful and/or unconstitutional under the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or Article 1 
Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution as being violative of the 
equal protection clause contained therein. 
2. Whether such fees exceed the scope of statutory authority 
given to the Public Service Commission to set reasonable and just 
utility rates. 
3. Whether such fees constitute an unjust and unreasonable 
standard and classification of service as prohibited by Utah Code 
Annotated 54-3-8. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner is a Utah non-profit corporation consisting of the 
homeowners of Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase I located a few 
miles southeast of Heriman, in Salt Lake County, Utah. Pursuant 
to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and Protective Covenants 
of the Association, all lot owners, whether developed or 
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undeveloped, are members of the association. The association is 
likewise charged with the duty of representing the interests of all 
lot owners regardless of their status of development. 
The tariff of Foothills Water Co., the publicly regulated 
utility which supplies culinary water service to the residents of 
the above subdivision, makes provision for certain "standby fees11. 
A standby fee is a charge or assessment levied against property 
adjacent to a water main but not usually connected to it. The 
utility remains "standing by" ready to serve the property at the 
request of the owner, although it does not at present provide any 
utility service to the lot owner. 
On or about July 17, 1988 Respondent, Foothills petitioned the 
Public Service Commission in Docket No. 87-2010-T03 for approval 
of various changes and amendments to its tariff, some of which 
dealt directly with the assessing of standby fees to lot owners not 
receiving regular water service by Foothills. Petitioner filed 
objections to those proposed changes and a hearing was held before 
the Commission on March 1, 1988. 
On or about March 9, 1988 the Commission granted in part and 
denied in part Foothills proposed changes. Each of the parties 
filed motions for review and rehearing and the Commission issued 
an Order on Motions for Review or Rehearing on April 7, 1988. Said 
Order in paragraph two (2) denied the Petitioners request that 
standby fees be eliminated from the proposed tariff. 
On or about March 10, 1988 Petitioner also filed a Petition 
for Declaratory Order in re Standby fees before the Public Service 
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Commission in Docket No. 88-2010-01, (proceedings were subsequently 
transferred and undertaken in Docket No. 85-2010-01). Said 
Petition was argued before the Commission on March 22, 1988 
following which the Commission took the matter under advisement. 
Respondent Commission has failed and refused to enter a decision 
in that case insisting that its ruling in the above reference 
tariff case (Docket No. 87-2010-T03) was sufficient and disposed 
of the matter without need for a specific Order denying the 
Petition for a Declaratory Order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Petitioner alleges that standby fees are an improper 
regulatory revenue generating devise and are further 
unconstitutional. Although there is no Utah authority directly on 
point and this matter is one of first impression for this Court, 
there is clear and overwhelming authority from other jurisdictions 
that absent a specific enabling statute or contractual basis, such 
fees are unreasonable and unconstitutional in that they deny the 
payees procedural due process. 
Petitioner further alleges that Utah has no specific enabling 
statue which would authorized the Public Service Commission to 
allow such fees in the tariffs of publicly regulated water 
companies. The general grant of authority to the Commission to 
set "just and reasonable" utility rates is not specific enough to 
allow this innovative method of generating revenue for a utility 
from is prospective customers. 
In addition, Petitioner alleges that such fees apart from not 
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being statutorily authorized are in fact prohibited by specific 
state statute in Utah Code Annotated 54-3-8 in that such fees 
constitute an "unjust and unreasonable standard and classification 
of service to be furnished." 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDBY FEES ARE UNREASONABLE, UNLAWFUL AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED IN THE TARIFFS OF 
PUBLICLY REGULATED UTILITIES. 
This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah and 
the issue of the lawfulness of "standby", "availability" or 
"readiness to serve" charges has never been considered by a Utah 
Court of record. There is however a well defined body of law 
dealing with this issue which has been developed in other 
jurisdictions which is worthy of recognition here. 
The seminal case is Forest Hills v. Public Utilities 
Commission 285 N.E. 2d 702 (Ohio 1972). In Forest Hills the Ohio 
Supreme Court considered a challenge to standby fees assessed to 
owners of unoccupied lots. At the administrative level the Ohio 
Public Utilities Commission had allowed an "availability fee" to 
be charged against nonusers of a water system in order to generate 
additional operating revenue for the utility. On appeal from the 
Commission's ruling a unanimous Court held: 
The assessment by the Public Utilities 
Commission of an availability fee charged 
against nonusers of a water and sewer system 
utility, who are not connected to those systems 
but to whom such service is available, is 
unreasonable and unlawful. Ibid at 709. 
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The broad invalidation of standby fees in Forest Hills was 
partially undercut two years later in the case of Mohawk Utilities 
v. Public Utilities Commission 307 N.E. 2d 261 (Ohio 1974). 
Following the decision in Forest Hills, such fees were attacked in 
the tariffs of other utilities and the Ohio Public Utilities 
Commission following the authority of Forest Hills held that: 
This commission rules in favor of the 
complainant and declares the "available for 
use" classification and charge in the 
respondents rate schedule unreasonable and 
unlawful. Mohawk at 262. 
The Public Utilities Commission in its Order and opinion 
directed Mohawk Utilities to cease collecting the water-
availability charges, and to file new tariffs eliminating such 
charges. In partially overruling Forest Hills the Court in Mohawk 
noted that a significant difference in the facts between the two 
cases was that the sales contracts entered into between the parties 
in Mohawk specifically authorized the standby fees in dispute. 
In Forest Hills, we held that, since the 
commission had no statutory authority to impose 
an availability fee, the order imposing such 
a charge was unreasonable and unlawful. In the 
instant case, the commission was considering 
a water-availability charge which was part of 
a sales contract entered into between the 
parties... Therefore, the decision of the 
commission that Mohawk Utilities availability-
for use charges are per se contrary to law is 
unreasonable and unlawful. Ibid at 263. 
The distinction between the two cases is critical since 
parties can contractually agree to be bound to greater restrictions 
than can be imposed in the absence of their consent. The 
contractual issue takes on a constitutional dimension in this case 
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since it invokes questions of procedural due process. In 
Aughenbauah v. Board of Supervisors of Tuolumne County 188 Cal. 
Rptr. 523 (App. 1983), owners of unimproved lots in a subdivision 
brought suit seeking a refund of water standby charges claiming 
that they were denied procedural due process by the collection of 
the charges. In Aughenbauah, like Mohawk, there was a contractual 
basis for the charges. The Court held as follows: 
Appellant's only constitutional challenge 
to the validity of the water standby charges 
is one of procedural due process, i.e., they 
have been deprived of their property (money) 
without proper notice. The argument is without 
merit. 
Procedural due process safeguards are 
designed to provide an individual with the 
right to be heard before being condemned to 
suffer serious loss of property. (Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law (1978) p.502) Fair 
notice requirements were met in the instant 
case. When appellants purchased their lots 
they were required to sign that they had 
received and read a copy of the Final 
Subdivision Public Report issued by the 
California Real Estate Commissioner on 
September 16, 1969. This report specifically 
recited that the revenue bonds; xare secured 
by a lien upon revenue to be derived from water 
standby and other charges to be prescribed, 
revised, and collected by the community 
services district from lot owners within the 
district. Water standby charges, if 
delinquent, may be collected on the county tax 
role and may result in -a lien upon your lot 
subjecting it to foreclosure proceedings... 
The stand-by charge is payable by the lot 
owners whether or not any water is used.' Ibid 
at 528. 
In like regard is the Court of Appeals of North Carolina which in 
the syllabus to State Utilities Commission v. Carolina Forest 
Utilities Inc., 21 N.C. App. 146 (1974) stated as follows: 
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Utilities Commission had jurisdiction and 
authority to allow use of availability charge, 
in rate schedule, should any be deserved, where 
availability charge had been agreed to in 
contracts between the parties, i.e. , where each 
purchaser of lot in recreational development 
had agreed to pay annual water service fee 
whether or not he actually tapped onto line or 
used any water. 
Thus, there has come to be two lines of cases affecting the 
lawfulness of standby fees. Such fees are generally invalid under 
Forest Hills analysis, unless they qualify for a Mohawk type 
exception by the presence of a specific state enabling statute or 
a contract binding the party sought to be charged. Absent this 
type of notice such fees are unconstitutional as violative of the 
notice requirements of procedural due process. This potential 
defect was succinctly stated in Smith v. Township of Norton 2 
Mich.App. 17 (1965) wherein the Court of Appeal of Michigan 
invalidated standby fees holding as follows: 
Anyone using services of township water system 
by implication contracts to pay but to charge 
nonusers for services made available by its 
presence without regard to whether any use is 
made of the services or facility is in legal 
effect a tax and can be effected only by 
complying with statutory requirements and not 
be creation of a charge within the rate 
structure of the public service. Ibid at 525. 
It is important to note that the instant case falls clearly 
under the Forest Hills line of authority. There is simply no 
contract between the parties which could authorize the charges and 
absent such a contract, the Mohawk exception does not apply. 
Petitioners were unsuccessful in finding a single case upholding 
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standby fees absent a specific state enabling statute or contract. 
Petitioners represent owners of unimproved vacant lots as well 
as developed lot owners who have their own independent source of 
water through on site wells. Said individuals, who are subject to 
the standby fees in the Respondent utilities tariff are "standby 
customers" only the most general and tortured sense of the term. 
They are not standing by waiting for service from the utility and 
in fact actively maintain that they do not want any service from 
the utility. It is only the utility which is "standing by" and it 
is waiting for customers that may never materialize. At best, the 
vacant lot and well owners can be said to be only prospective 
customers, who may never connect to the water system and make use 
of the utilities services. 
It is difficult under such circumstances to say that the lot 
owners receive any benefit from the utility standing by ready to 
serve them. Any benefit they do receive is incidental and should 
not be charged to them. In Smith the parties stipulated that the 
availability of a water system added to the value of the property 
and in fact conferred a material benefit but that was held to be 
insufficient to justify the imposition of standby fees on such 
owners. The Court quoted The Law of Revenue Bonds . Chernak (19 54) 
with approval stating: "The rates, of course, must be based upon 
use and not special benefit or other similar criteria, unless 
special assessment proceedings are accepted." Ibid at 200. 
It is natural and expected that any property owner will obtain 
some benefit from his surroundings and the services readily 
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available in the vicinity. Said services may increase the value 
of his property and subject him to greater property taxes but he 
should not be liable to the vendor, as a mere prospective customer, 
until he actually utilizes the services the vendor is standing by 
ready to provide. 
II. THE ASSESSMENT OF STANDBY FEES EXCEEDS AND IS OUTSIDE THE 
LEGISLATIVE GRANT OF AUTHORITY GIVEN TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION. 
The Public Service Commission is a creature of the legislature 
and it is well established that the Commission has no inherent 
regulatory power other than those expressly granted or clearly 
implied by statute. Basin Flying Service, v. Public Service 
Commission 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1975). 
The Commission has two specific applicable grants of 
authority. The first is found in Utah Code Annotated 54-4-1 (1969) 
which states: 
The Commission is hereby vested with power 
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate 
every public utility in this state, and to 
supervise all of the business of every such 
public utility in this state, and to do all 
things, whether herein specifically designated 
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or 
convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction... 
This very broad statute does not however authorize the type 
of rate making challenged herein. This Court in interpreting the 
statute recently stated: 
... this statute has never been interpreted by 
this Court as conferring upon the Commission 
a limitless right to act as it sees fit. 
Explicit or clearly implied statutory authority 
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for any regulatory action must exist. Mountain 
States Telephone v. Public Service Commission 
81 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 at 8. Citing Utah Dep't 
of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
720 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986) Kearns-Tribune 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 682 P.2d 858, 859 
(Utah 1984); cf. Basin Flying Serv., 531 P.2d 
at 1305. 
As argued above, a standby fee when not based upon use 
constitutes a tax, which is not permissable within the rate making 
authority of the Public Service Commission. (See Smith v. Norton, 
Supra). In like regard this Court in Mountain States stated: 
Similarly, not one of the statutes 
granting the Commission more specific powers 
authorizes, either explicitly or implicitly, 
the kind of pooling arrangement adopted by the 
Commission in this case. Ibid at 8. 
Although Mountain States dealt with telephone carrier surcharge 
pooling as a means of funding a discounted telephone service, its 
analysis is directly applicable to water standby fees, which like 
the Lifeline rates invalidated in Mountain States, are neither 
explicitly or implicitly authorized by any state statute. 
The only other applicable state statute is found in Utah Code 
Annotated 54-3-1 (1977) which provides: 
All charges made, demanded or received by 
any public utility, or by any two or more 
public utilities for any product or commodity 
furnished or to be furnished, or for any 
service rendered or to be rendered shall be 
just and reasonable. Every unjust or 
unreasonable charge made, demanded or received 
for such product or commodity or service is 
hereby prohibited and declared unlawful. Every 
public utility shall furnish, provide and 
maintain such service, instrumentalities, 
equipment and facilities as will promote the 
safety, health, comfort and convenience of its 
patrons, employees and the public, and as will 
be in all respects adequate, efficient, just 
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and reasonable. All rules and regulations made 
by a public utility affecting or pertaining to 
its charges or service to the public shall be 
just and reasonable. The scope of definition 
xjust and reasonablex may include, but shall 
not be limited to, the cost of providing 
service to each category of customer, economic 
impact of charges on each category of customer, 
and on the well-being of the state of Utah; 
methods of reducing wide periodic variations 
in demand of such products, commodities or 
services, and means of encouraging conservation 
of resources and energy. 
The "just and reasonable" standard incorporated in the above 
statute is the cornerstone and controlling concept in utility rate 
making. It is difficult however to imagine a more unjust and 
unreasonable rate than one which is artificially low because it is 
subsidized by nonusers. 
It is undisputed that the sole purpose for standby fee, as 
used by the Utah Public Service Commission, is to generate 
additional revenue for the utility. In effect the nonusers of the 
water system underwrite and support artificially low rates for the 
users. Thus, neither the "standby customers" nor the active users 
pay a "just and reasonable rate". The standby customers pay for 
something for which they receive no consideration or chargeable 
benefit, while the users pay an artificially low rate due to the 
standby subsidy. 
Although no Utah Court has had the opportunity to address this 
statute in this context, other Courts have had such an opportunity 
when construing similar statutes. In fact, it was in part this 
very problem with the requirement for "just and reasonable rates" 
which lead the Ohio Supreme Court to invalidate standby fees in 
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Forest Hills. 
Under R.C. $4909.39, the commission shall 
fix and determine ^the just and reasonable 
rate' to be charged by such public utility. 
Nowhere has the General Assembly empowered the 
Public Utilities Commission to fix dual rates 
to be charged according to a customer's use or 
nonuse of the utility's service. Therefore, 
the commission acted both unreasonably and 
unlawfully in establishing two rates. Ibid at 
708. 
III. THE ASSESSMENT OF STANDBY FEES TO NONUSERS CONSTITUTES 
AN UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE STANDARD AND CLASSIFICATION OF SERVICES 
AND IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTE. 
Utah Code Annotated 54-3-8 (1953) provides: 
No public utility shall, as to rates, 
charges, service, facilities or in any other 
respect, make or grant any preference or 
advantage to any person, or subject any person 
to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public 
utility shall establish or maintain any 
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, 
service or facilities, or in any other respect, 
either as between localities or as between 
classes of service. The commission shall have 
power to determine any question of fact arising 
under this section. 
This statute has rarely been interpreted by this Court, 
however in the case of Cedar City Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission 290 P. 2d 454 (Utah 1955) the Court stated the purpose 
of the statue to be as follows: 
The statute empowers the Commission to 
prevent the granting of any preference or 
advantage to any person, or subject any person 
to any prejudice or disadvantage. Ibid at 457. 
In spite of this instruction, standby fees by their very 
nature grant one class of users a preference and advantage while 
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subjecting another class, the standby customers, to prejudice and 
disadvantage. As argued above, the existence of standby fees 
allows active users to enjoy artificially low rates due to the 
subsidy by standby customers. This Court long ago declared such 
a practice to be unlawful. 
This section prohibits a utility from 
establishing or maintaining discriminatory or 
preferential rates or charges, or any 
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, 
or service between localities or classes of 
service. Logan City v. Public Utilities 
Commission 77 U. 442, 296 P. 1006. 
Petitioners do not dispute that a utility should be 
compensated for the unused capacity it must maintain in order to 
meet the service requirements of new customers, however that 
compensation should come from connection fees rather than standby 
fees. The tariff at issue allows the assessment of a $750.00 
connection fee at the time a lot owner comes "on system" and 
becomes an active user. That fee is in excess of the actual costs 
of connection and is the best way of passing the cost of 
maintaining unused capacity to those who have made it necessary. 
Only connection fees directly pass the cost on to those who have 
received the benefit of the utility standing by to serve them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is submitted that: 
1. This Court should declare standby and other similar fees 
to be improper, unlawful and outside the scope of authority granted 
to the Public Service Commission for utility rate making, and 
2. Order an accounting of all standby fees paid by nonusers 
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and order a refund of said amounts to them. 
WHEREFORE, it is requested that the Order of the Public 
Service Commission upholding the lawfulness of standby fees be 
reversed, that said fees be declared invalid and that any sums paid 
as standby fees be returned to the payees and that Petitioners 
receive its fees and costs incurred on this appeal. 
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